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Miscreation 
Richard Shiff 
Introduction 
Many modern critics of art have regarded criticism as 
an art in itself. The critical account has its origin in the 
work of art but strikes out on its own , perhaps to 
extend the artistic world formed by the object of its 
scrutiny or even dialectically to confront that world 
and re-form it into yet another creation . In such critical 
practice, strict evaluation of new artistic constructs, 
in terms of old or traditional norms, may in itself be 
considered bad form; judgment of this kind binds 
human creativity to a fixed center by a chain of 
finite length , and the circle of creative activity cannot 
expand. Yet, as I will ultimately argue in this essay, 
the critic 's first responsibility is to his own fixed 
principles , not the rude innovations of an unfamiliar 
art. Criticism has good reason to maintain its critical 
distance from art and to challenge malformed 
creations, miscreations, wherever they appear. 
The notion of miscreation readily calls forth visual 
images. We may think of grotesque mutations, com-
binations of unrelated species or improperly formed 
beings with the wrong placement or number of limbs. 
We may even conjure up a familiar object, distorted 
with regard to its internal proportional relationships-
a chair with legs of four different lengths. Such images 
challenge conventional definitions and are inherently 
both frightening and comical ; our specific emotional 
response will depend upon the context in which we 
encounter these bizarre constructions that confuse 
our rational order. 
Images that may threaten are often transformed into 
ones that provide humor through the art of caricature. 
The foreign warmonger looks funny and harmless in 
the political cartoon. Alternatively, caricature may 
exaggerate a form so that its largely hidden impro-
priety stands revealed. Caricature both employs and 
exposes miscreation . Thus, in order to investigate 
the relation of a modern critic to a work of art-
an adversary relationship where creation may appear 
as miscreation- we shall study examples of caricature 
as well as art which lends itself to caricature. But 
first we must understand what makes the modern 
critic specifically "modern"; we must consider his 
tendency to subject his evaluation of creativity to a 
judgment of originality. When originality is at stake, 
questions of creation become especially difficult. 
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Part I 
"To create something means to make it non-technically, 
but yet consciously and voluntarily. " Such was R. G. 
Collingwood 's definition of artistic creation made in 
1938. In his concern to distinguish artistic activity 
from technical procedure, or, more simply, to distin-
guish art from craft, Collingwood was typical of his 
time, and even of our time. He argued that, although 
human creation was distinct from divine creation , it 
was yet a pure bringing into being, not a mere trans-
formation of preexisting material. Works of art, 
Collingwood writes, 
are not made as means to an end; they are not 
made according to any preconceived plan; and they are 
not made by imposing a new form upon a given matter. 
Yet they are made deliberately and responsibly, by 
people who know what they are doing , even though they 
do not know in advance what is going to come of it. 
The creation which theologians ascribe to God is 
peculiar in one way and on ly one. [The peculiarity] 
is that in the case of his act there lacks not on ly a 
prerequisite in the shape of a matter to be transformed , 
but any prerequisite of any kind whatsoever [In con-
trast,] in order that a work of art shou ld be created , 
the prospective artist. .. must have in him certain unex-
pressed emotions, and must also have the wherewithal 
to express them .. 
The artistic experience is not generated out of 
nothing. [1938: 128 - 130, 273]1 
Still, for Collingwood, works of human art may be 
"original ," like God 's creations, despite their contin-
gency and the need for an artistic medium or lan-
guage. He writes that 
Every genuine [artistic] expression must be an original 
one .... The artistic activity does not "use" a "ready-made 
language", it "creates" language as it goes along. 
[1938:275]2 
Collingwood takes pains to argue that artistic expres-
sion is not restricted by preexisting expressive patterns. 
In effect, he seeks to deny any fully determining role 
to the world of discourse and technical procedure in 
which the artist is situated, although this situation 
is surely a major aspect of what he calls the "circum-
stances" that facilitate creation , circumstances to 
which God is not held . Collingwood is cognizant of 
the importance of the medium when he writes that 
"there is no way of expressing the same feeling in 
two different media" and that a conscious (or imagin-
ative) " idea is had as an idea only in so far as it 
is expressed [in a medium]." But the defining force 
of the medium itself seems to dissipate as Colling-
wood approaches the logical extreme of his own 
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position- "every word [i.e. , every objectified artistic 
expression] as it actually occurs in discourse, occurs 
once and once only" (1938:245 , 249, 256). 3 
Artistic language does not await its use in repetition ; 
man "creates" language as he "goes along. " Every 
expression is original. 
For Collingwood , then , artistic translation must 
always be problematic. In the broader view, what 
can be expressed in French cannot be conveyed in 
English ; in the finer aspect, what can be said with one 
word at one time cannot be said with another, or even 
with the same, at another time. To use the same words 
self-consciously to mean the same thing a second 
time, is , for Collingwood, to deny expression and to 
convert art to cliche (1 938 :245 , 275- 276). In a recent 
publication , Northrop Frye points similarly to the degree 
of " re-creative" translation in any proper appreciation 
of another's artistic expression , or indeed in any 
appreciation of God 's creation (1980: 64 ff). Human 
creation, for both Collingwood and Frye, thus cannot 
be confined to imitative representation but involves 
an original expression (Collingwood) or an original 
re-creation (Frye). Curiously, the accounts of both 
Collingwood and Frye indicate that mere representa-
tion , if it were desired , would be no simple matter. 
Representation would fail because of the impossibility 
of any perfected translation . Something, if only the 
intangible sincerity of expression of which Collingwood 
speaks, would be altered. Hence, even mere represen-
tations , in differing from their "originals," would be 
unique and original to some degree, however accidental 
this originality might seem. Do Collingwood and Frye 
(along with many others) confer privilege on genuine 
artistic creation by ascribing to it an originality that is 
consciously generated?4 The unique aspect of any 
human creation might result equally well from the 
inevitable failure of language or mediated communi-
cation as from a heroic struggle to gain knowledge of 
one's self and others. 
Although he remains undaunted , Collingwood does 
not speak to this issue with his customary certitude. 
He admits , in fact he willingly asserts, that 
community of language is not [prior to its use]. One does 
not first acquire a language and then use it. To possess 
it and to use it are the same. We only come to possess it 
by repeatedly and progressively attempting to use it. 
The reader may object that if what is here maintained 
were true there could never be any absolute assurance, 
either for the hearer or the speaker, that the one had 
understood the other. That is so; but in fact there is no 
such assurance. The only assurance we possess is an 
empirical and relative assurance, becoming progressively 
stronger as conversation proceeds, and based on the fact 
that neither party seems to the other to be talking non-
sense. The question whether they understand each other 
solvitur interloquendo [is settled in the talking]. If they 
understand each other well enough to go on talking , they 
understand each other as well as they need ; and there 
is no better kind of understanding which they can regret 
not having attained . [1938:250 - 251 ; cf. 309] 
But, we might argue, there is, indeed, a better kind 
of understanding -a silence, an end to the talking. 
Continuing communication , continuing attempts at 
communication , may indicate a continuing doubt or 
misunderstanding . Conversation remains subject to 
the refractions of mediation or translation ; only silence 
is unmediated. Does silence, not conversation, indicate 
agreement? Or is it merely lack of communication? 
Collingwood does not explore this problem , for he 
associates human language and human creation with 
a life of change and growth , a continuing creation 
(like Frye's process of re-creation) , which is not limited 
by time, but defines it. Only silence escapes time and 
the question of origin ; true silence, unlike a mere pause 
in conversation , is immeasurably repetitious, lacking 
even the differentiation of temporal displacement. An 
end to the talking , to the linguistic exchange, would 
signify an end to Collingwood 's emotional expression , 
or, alternatively, the final convergence and identity of 
Frye's re-creation with its antecedent (and ultimately 
divine) creation. Continuous silence would signify either 
a stasis of death or of an eternal life , but not the 
changing , transient human condition we know. 5 
Collingwood 's sense of originality involves much 
more than the uniqueness of displacement, difference, 
or alterity.6 It establishes a primacy and a subsequent 
hierarchical process of communication in which con-
scious meaningful expression is privileged . Technical 
procedures evident in acts of human creativity are 
subordinated to the demanding presence of emotional 
experience, the living origin. The meaning of a work 
of ~rt comes into being by means of an artistic language 
wh1ch_1s somehow guided by human will to embody 
meanmg. Although artistic meaning does not exist 
pnor to artistic creation , it seems the essential core 
toward which any conscious act of will is directed . 
Hence, exchanges of meaning , conversations , have 
for Collingwood more than arbitrary or accidental sig-
nificance; genuine discovery, communication , and 
sharing of meaning occur. For post-Structuralist critics, 
such as Jacques Derrida, this hierarchical relationship 
m1ght call for "deconstruction " (1977 , esp .. 195). 
One .'"r:ight wish to investigate the hidden consequences 
of pnv_1legmg originality and unique, even "discovered ," 
meanmg as essential qualities of artistic creation . 
Collingwood must indeed admit that human creation 
unlike divine creation, involves some technical pro- ' 
cedure , a specific process of making that may be 
know~ to many. In general, human creative activity is 
conc_e1ved _a~ mediated, having an internal logic and 
runn1ng a fm1te cou rse through time - such are its 
"circumstances. "7 An example of a "creative" activity 
Miscreation 
Collingwood would not consider art serves to demon-
strate the importance of our awareness of this media-
tion , despite its secondary role in Collingwood 's system . 
When a magician waves his arm and a rabbit appears, 
the adults in the audience assume some special 
technique has been employed ; the rabbit is not created 
immediately and out of nothing , but as a result of a 
process which may have escaped the notice of both 
adults and children . One assumes that the magician 
knows full well that the rabbit will appear. Because the 
magician has preconceived the end of his "art ," his 
activity is not art in Collingwood 's terms, but craft. Yet , 
without an allowance for the technical procedure that 
was not observed, one would have to admit to having 
witnessed some genuine transcendent "art" rather 
than the performance of an ultimately material skill or 
"craft." This mere magic, denigrated by Collingwood , 
would become a truly magical art. The rabbit would 
become an unforeseen and original expression , the 
expression of a most powerful being who can bring 
forth not only living language, but life itself. Humans, 
however, should not create, or even procreate, rabbits. 
We may laugh at the miscreation of the magic act 
because we know it results from mere clever craft. But 
would the comical act of miscreation evoke fright, 
rather, if its magic were perceived as " real?" How 
extreme a case of creation -extreme in its indepen-
dence from craft - can we tolerate? 
Despite our need to assume the mediation of tech-
nical procedure in the case of the magician 's creation, 
modern critics have freely associated artistic creativity 
with genius and originality; these qualities, like magical 
. appearances of the most mysterious sort, seem dis-
junctive and independent of any known generative or 
mediating process. In the case of art, in other words, 
we willingly expose ourselves to potential miscreation 
1 of the sort we refuse to acknowledge in magic. We may 
1 grant that Collingwood 's sense of artistic language 
seems to allow for both mediation and originality, so 
that art can maintain a footing in both rational expression 
and free discovery-this is the appeal of Collingwood 's 
theory. Still , such an open concept of artistic means 
1 precludes certain kinds of judgments, or at least 
1 makes them impractical . Given the innovative nature 
of artistic language itself, we are led to establish fixed 
categories , corresponding to modes of activity, in order 
to contain that language in its proper place. As a result, 
we cannot judge magicians as we would artists , simply 
regarding the consequences of their immediate actions 
without necessarily applying a standard of craft. We 
seem to expect a standardization in magicians' acts 
that we do not expect from "artists'." One act of creating 
a rabbit is regarded like any other, but one act of paint-
ing is not like the others before it nor the others to come. 
If we do not expect paintings to be alike, how then can 
we know who is a true artist? Is anyone who makes 
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any painting an artist? Do we judge simply by dis-
tinguishing the medium employed , the means of 
creation? If so , one conclusion is indeed simple: those 
who produce rabbits are practic ing magic, while those 
who produce paintings are practicing art. 
Paintings, as works of art, are original; yet each may 
result from the same general creative technique. The 
procedures of artistic creation are shared like the 
magician 's tricks, while the distinguishing artistic 
originality, supposedly lacking in magic acts, seems to 
arise "out of nothing. " Despite the fact that we fre-
quently use the terms "original " and "creative" as near 
equals in everyday speech , they have the potential to 
diverge, just as "art" differentiates itself from repetitive 
magical performance. Creativity seems more naturally 
linked to technical procedure than does originality. 
Magic acts do not have to be original to be good. 
In general , judgments of creative technique seem 
capable of standing on a more rational foundation than 
do judgments of originality. According to the shared 
conventions of the medium , one can investigate 
whether a work has been made properly, efficiently, or 
elegantly. The judgment of originality, in contrast, is 
bound to the living person of the artist as a source of 
expression ; the sincerely searching failure may thus 
appear more praiseworthy than the facile technical 
success. When the critic considers originality of pri-
mary importance in the act of creation , defining crea-
tion (as Collingwood does, for example) in terms of 
originality, judgments of creativity cannot depend upon 
an evaluation of technical excellence. Good magic may 
result from a good hand , but such skillful manipulation 
will not guarantee good art. Whenever creativity is 
associated with originality, the factor of rational making 
becomes secondary. The value of craftsmanship is 
cast into doubt, and questions of technique become 
confused . Miscreations arise from this critical chaos. 
Part II 
"Miscreation" is a word rarely used today; it is an 
evasive term , yet part of the family of the more familiar 
"creation. " Its difficulty does not lie in the prefix "mis-" 
that calls our attention to deviance. We all make mis-
takes , misinterpret, and even misbehave. We are often 
misinformed , suffer mishaps, and at times may feel 
misanthropic. Few of us, however, are likely to be called 
"miscreant," a strongly pejorative term that bears upon 
"miscreation " when we consider the practice of 
criticism . 
Possibly, "miscreant" and "miscreation " share a 
remote linguistic origin. The rare words "creant" and 
"miscreance" have a double existence, deriving in their 
first sense (believing/misbelief) from the Latin credere, 
and in their second (creating/misgrowth, misshaping , 
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miscreation) from the Latin creare. Whether or not 
the two forms of "miscreance" relate to a single distant 
source, "miscreant" and "miscreation" seem to con-
verge semantically in some sense of education or 
development, entailing both be lief (or principle) and 
growth. I wish to arg ue that the judgment of .an act . 
of creation/miscreation , when associated w1th ongl-
nality, does, indeed , bear strongly upon , and can be 
correlated with, a judgment of the belief (or heresy) of 
the creator. A modern sense of creation , in other 
words , with its focus upon originality, brings issues of 
belief and social value into question. Furthermore, I will 
argue that the evaluating judge or critic must play 
a negative ro le, revealing fraud but never (save by 
indirection) "creative gen ius. " Final ly, I will relate mis-
creation to the interpretive strategies of the critic and 
art historian. 
Figure 1 Sidney Harris. Cartoon for American Scientist, 
reprinted in Time, CXIII, 8 (Feb. 19, 1979): 75. 
Part Ill 
As I have noted , caricature both employs and exposes 
miscreation. In addition, caricature plays upon our 
sense of conventional wisdom or shared , received 
opinion ; it reveals the gap between what is readily 
accepted and what challenges belief. So we begin our 
study of images of creation and created images with 
two humorous drawings that comment on works of 
"creative genius," that is, works which might claim 
both creative (technical) excellence and originality. 
These drawings are potentially destructive of the 
dignity of their subjects. Both suggest the relationship 
between creation and miscreation. The first deals with 
Albert Einstein and the realm of science, and the 
second with Edouard Manet and the realm of art. We 
leave open for the moment the question of whether 
scientific and artistic creativity are generally evaluated 
in the same manner. 
Sidney Harris economically represents Einstein with 
the familiar pipe and baggy clothing and the distinctive 
amorphous tussled hair-the product of "neglect," as 
Einstein himself put it (Figure 1). Harris renders 
Einstein's personal eccentricity distinctly; he is not the 
neatly groomed Niels Bohr, another "genius," but one 
who never attracted the same public attention to his 
physical presence. Einstein 's environment seems as 
disorderly as does his person : papers are scattered 
about. There is surely no great sense of authority here, 
yet we recognize the figure 's special identity, in 
particular because of the immanent presence of the 
formula E=mc2 . The correlation of energy with mass 
by means of the factor of "the speed of light" has 
generated useful physical models as well as powerful 
imaginative fictions. Yet Einstein , the author of the equa-
tion that inspired both scientists and artists, remains 
undignified , his activity in a certain disorder, or rather 
in an improper order. His mathematical , theoretical 
speculation seems as given to chance ("neglect") as is 
his physical appearance. He works systematically, but 
his system is one of nonsense. He tries out E=ma2 ; it 
doesn 't go. E=mb2 is no better. Lucky Einstein, we 
laugh , he got it on the third try; if the symbol for the 
speed of light had been as anonymous and antepenul-
timate as "x," he would have been up late into the night. 
Einstein 's accomplishment, the creation of the formula 
E=mc2 , is here shown to be a product of chance, and 
hence created, as it were, out of nothing, through 
no consciously meaningful procedure. Whether this 
amounts to an admirable act of genius or perspi-
cacity, as opposed to a mere lucky break, will depend 
upon the viewer's ultimate identification of Einstein as 
"one of them " or "one of us." Is he one of an alien 
class of distinct geniuses? Or is all apparent genius 
contingent upon chance occurrence , so that some 
day we might all have our own moments of great 
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discovery? In either case , genius , in popular com-
mentary, is depicted as disjunctive , independent of 
rational procedure. As Roland Barthes has pointed 
out, direct "photographs of Einstein show him standing 
next to a blackboard covered with mathematical 
signs of obvious complexity ; but cartoons of Einstein 
(the sign that he has become a legend) show him chalk 
still in hand , and having just written on an empty 
blackboard , as if without preparation , the magic for-
mula of the world " (1972:69) .8 Einstein is well known 
to have denied a role to chance , both in the physical 
universe and in his own c reative process (Wertheimer 
1959:69) . Yet the evidence of cartoon and caricature 
indicates that in the popular mind his scientific cre-
ations appeared as works of art, as original as could 
be, discovered like (in Barthes' words) "a basic ele-
ment, a principia! substance ," independent of any 
complex , rational generative procedure. 
If the Harris caricature makes Einstein seem more 
like one of us , subject to our own chance discoveries, 
his personal achievement is thus belittled. Still , 
Einstein 's theory of relativity is seen very much as his 
own creation ; we wonder whether this scientific "fact" 
could have been observed by another mind . It seems 
as if Einstein has - in god-like fashion and , paradoxi-
cally, perhaps in spite of himself-created something 
out of nothing . Although college freshmen can be 
taught to perform Einstein 's mathematical proof, the 
essence of the creative act does not seem to lie in 
this acquired mathematical skil l. As Polanyi and Prosch 
notes, "Once a scientist has made a discovery or an 
engineer has produced a new mechanism , the posses-
sion of these things by others requires little effort of the 
imagination " (1978 :85). Perhaps there was , indeed , 
some luck involved in the difficult original discovery; 
perhaps Einstein was , at that moment, as confused 
or as astounded as his caricaturists might imply. 
Einstein 's creation may appear threateningly foreign 
to his audience ; and in caricature , it might even 
frighten the scientist himself. The popularized version 
of the Frankenstein story reveals that when chance is 
introduced into scientific procedure, the result can be 
monstrous, an obvious case of miscreation. Although 
not a living monster, E=mc2 may yet be a very 
imposing figure, not only because of its ultimate incom-
prehensibility, its disconnection from simpler common 
knowledge , but because it is formed from the "foreign " 
symbolic language of higher mathematics. Signifi-
cantly, the caricaturist chooses to identify Einstein 
with this seemingly opaque language, still further 
removed from our everyday reality than is the strangely 
awkward man himself. The special language facilitates 
the scientist's thought, yet will seem to deflect our own 
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attempts at penetration. And so it is the language itself, 
the scientist's means of expression and discovery, that 
may suffer at the interpretive hands of the trivializing 
caricaturist- the generating pri nci pie of Einstein 's 
symbolically coded message becomes nothing more 
than the sequence of the alphabet. He merely pro-
ceeds from a to b to c. 
Because "original " creation appears as the making 
of something out of nothing or the production of 
something greater than the sum of its parts - the cre-
ation of new value or significance-the caricaturist , 
reintroducing common sense, shows that , in fact, out 
of nothing will come nothing and out of something , 
nothing more. Let us consider our second example of 
caricature , this one from the realm of artistic creativity. 
As in our scientific case , the creative means of expres-
sion , the artistic symbolism , comes most directly 
under attack. Cham 's humorous representation of 
Manet's Incident in the Bull Ring (Figures 2 and 3) 
exaggerates to absurdity the technical features for 
which the artist was known .9 Manet's painting exhibited 
only a limited range of modeling ; he would employ two 
or three tones within a given area of local color where 
five or six might be demanded by conventional prac-
tice. Cham represents Manet's painting as an image of 
the crudest silhouettes ; there is no modeling at all , 
no sense of gradation from dark to light, merely black 
on white in its barren flatness. To his caricature , Cham 
added the following caption: " Having had to complain 
of his paint supplier, Manet resolves henceforth to 
employ only his inkwell ." 
Cham succeeds in impugning both Manet's tech-
nique and the artistic intention which informed it. 
For Emile Zola , Manet's public spokesman , this artist 
wished merely to express himself and his own environ-
ment; simply put, he wished only to paint what he 
actually saw in his own individual experience. His task 
necessarily became a heroic one, radically creative , 
as soon as he realized that he could not depend upon 
inherited artistic convention but must draw forth his 
technical means from an intelligent use of materials 
directed by his own immediate vision. In other words , 
according to Zola , Manet subordinated his creativity 
to his originality. Zola and other sympathetic critics 
argued that Manet's "summary" system of modeling 
could adequately express the artist and his special 
world particularly because this attenuated modeling 
ultimately was independent of convention. 10 Zola 's 
recognition , however, could come as a challenge to 
those less concerned with individuality who would 
accept a mode of vision already established . Wary of 
fraud , the caricaturist Cham thus proceeds to accuse 
Manet of ignoble intention or trivial concern , attributing 
his reduced modeling not to the authenticity of his 
vision , but, in the end , to a lack of rapport with his 
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paint seller. In Cham 's representation , this suspect 
modeling becomes not merely diminished , but un-
recognizable as any valid variation of standard practice. 
We see only flat , cut-out forms gesturing with a result-
ant lack of expressive ref inement. Manet sought to 
create a powerful art with limited means ; Cham repre-
sents this limitation as extreme deprivation that can 
generate no richness , but only an impoverished 
expression. Manet, according to Cham , rejects a valid 
technique of painting, replacing it by far inferior means 
from which he can bring forth no more than the given 
-from something very slight comes nothing grander. 
Manet's attempt at creation fails ; it is , in terms of the 
artistic achievements of its day, misconceived, misin-
formed , and misformed -a miscreation . 
Part IV 
At this point our caricatures call forth a potential 
similarity in valid scientific and artistic procedure, for 
we see that Cham seems to suggest that the visual 
artist , like the scientist , might deserve more personal 
credit if his achievement were attributable to a directed 
application of technique . Perhaps the artist has no 
more cause than the scientist to respond solely to 
immediate feeling. Just as Harris could challenge 
Einstein 's "genius" by showing his discovery to be the 
product of chance , so Cham seems to make Manet's 
choice of technique depend upon an extraneous con-
dition- Manet, angered at his paint merchant, has 
been led to use only black ink rather than a range of 
colored pigments. Thus, Manet's reduction of model-
ing is portrayed not as the product of reason but of 
a situation outside his complete control and unrelated 
to the artistic problem at hand. Traditionally, however, 
acts of both artistic and scientific genius have been 
held to be directed by uncontrolled inspiration or 
impulses that may indeed originate outside the world 
of reason- Plato , we know, referred to "divine mad-
ness. "1 1 But there is nothing of the divine in either 
Cham 's presentation of Manet or Harris 's depiction of 
Einstein . Cham 's caricature displaces Manet's putative 
lofty inspiration so that his external motivating force 
becomes an otherwise trivial aspect of the material 
situation in which he finds himself. Similarly, Harris 
humanizes the ethereal Einstein to the point where 
Figure 2 Cham . M anet's 
Incident in the Bull Ring 
( 1864 ), from Charivari, 
May 22 , 1864. 
Figure 3 Edouard 
Manet. The Dead Toreador 
(1864). National Gallery of 
Art, Washington, D.C., 
Widener Collection. 
Miscreation 
the common man may identify with his simple-minded 
determination ; it takes no divine force to make one's 
way through the order of the alphabet. Nor is Einstein 's 
discovery attributable to the great power of his reason . 
How then do we evaluate it? 
At issue here is a problem that arises in the evalua-
tion of all types of creative invention: from the point of 
view of the outside observer or critical interpreter (the 
caricaturist in our two specific cases) , the creation 
must appear the product of rational procedure if it is 
indeed to be judged rationally. The humor in carica-
tures of creation derives not only from the accusatory 
posture that the caricaturing public takes toward the 
threatening foreign object, exposing its miscreation, 
but also from the implied attempt to find rational founda-
tion where there can be none. Creation , conceived 
as original invention , can remain within no conven-
tional system of rational order. As Barthes noted, it is 
perceived as genuine magic-in this case the " rabbit" 
appears without our assumption of its dependence 
on technical procedure. 
The issue can be stated somewhat differently: all 
"original " creation is likely to be regarded as mis-
creation , and indeed all such creation is miscreation . 
During a period when creativity is generally identified 
with originality, " miscreation " becomes an unneces-
sary term , a redundancy, and we are not surprised to 
have observed, at the start, that it is an obsolete word, 
only rarely used during our own age . " Miscreation " 
does not stand to "creation " as " misbelief" to "belief" 
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or " misbehavior" to "behavior. " Systems of belief and 
patterns of behavior are established socially and 
shared among individuals. False beliefs and improper 
behavior are usually easily recognized and held up in 
contrast to the norm . In the case of the most radical 
creation, there seems to be no norm, for something 
new appears that is not merely a variation on the 
old. Such creation in any area must appear deviant 
from what reason would lead us to expect; and if any 
norm is to be applied, the creation will appear to be 
miscreation . All "original" creation is deviant. All such 
creation is miscreation. 
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Part V 
Much in our experience must be associated with the 
individual, yet evaluated socially. Social judgments 
imposed upon individuals do not deny individuality but 
frame it, restrict it to the realm of the assimilable. In 
attempting to preserve our values, we tend to be more 
troubled by deviance than by outright negation. One 
who holds a belief that seems a false variant of the 
prevailing belief becomes more of an immediate 
problem than one who holds no belief or whose values 
are so displaced that he seems simply insane. And 
those who misbehave are much more disturbing than 
those who do not behave at all. 12 A behavioral void 
signifies an annihilation, a physical death , or perhaps 
a total failure of will. While the prospect of annihilation , 
negative creation , normally seems remote, we must 
continually live with flawed creation , miscreation. 
Annihilation , even if it should occur, will either appear 
as a clearly distinct and very special phenomenon or 
will escape our notice, just as the fact that conversations 
end in silence seems to have escaped Collingwood 's 
full attention (1938 : 250-251 ). In other words , the loss of 
an object through annihilation , or the end of artistic 
expression in silence, may be mistaken for a mere 
misplacement or a misunderstanding. Although death 
or complete insanity (negation) may be feared, unlawful 
behavior (deviation) is the more immediate presence 
in our lives and thus the greater concern and threat 
to society. 
Miscreation, then , is like misbelief-it threatens not 
because it lacks or negates value, but because it 
introduces false value,· it does not appear worthless, 
but fraudulent, a representation that misrepresents. 
And the fear of fraud which always accompanies the 
socialized experience of the work of art makes us all 
even as critics or art historians, into caricaturists . ' 
When we perform as critics, judging acts of creation , 
we may not exercise the wit of Harris or Cham but 
we nevertheless must trivialize , recognizing an'y crea-
tion which serves originality, by denying its claim to 
reason. We insist on revealing the deception. 
I will attempt momentarily to develop my argument 
concerning criticism , but I must first reinforce a sense 
of creation that may not yet have come fully alive in my 
logic. I have argued that the relationship of miscreation 
to creation is not that of misbelief to belief; and I have 
also stated that miscreation is like misbelief. This argu-
ment suggests that creation as well as miscreation may 
be linked to misbelief; thus the potential identification 
of creation with miscreation can be sustained . Such is 
the result, again , of the association of creativity with 
originality; for any original making seems to express a 
dissatisfaction with the prevailing order of things. The 
creative act, if it must be original, becomes the act of 
misbelief, the act of the heretic , the expression of false 
or deviant values . The modern creator doubts; he 
challenges his society's institutions and seeks a deviant 
truth. The creative act belongs, then , to the miscreant, 
who may appear not only heretical , but villainous, a 
danger to his society. The miscreant artist does not 
have full faith in accepted laws and procedures; to a 
significant extent he works outside formulation and 
convention ; he seems to assume a godlike, or even 
satanic , stance. He may, moreover, seem the destructive 
wild man ; for he upsets order, causes confusion , and , 
in general , introduces the unpredictable. He seems to 
deny our rational sciences. 
Now the cri tical interpreter always assumes a rational 
stance; he must do so in order to attain a level of publ ic 
discourse giving form , or rather formulation , to the 
creation in question . This responsibility to reason 
cannot be obviated by the use of ind irect or evocative 
critical description ; for such language, if effective 
criticism , wil l stil l follow conventional patterns and 
suggest relevant comparisons. For example, one of 
Manet's distinguished critics, Theophile Thore, had 
this to say in response to his viewing the Incident in the 
Bull Ring : "M. Manet has the qualities of a mag ician , 
effects of luminosity, flamboyant coloration , which 
pastiche Velasquez and Goya, his chosen masters" 
(1893: Vol . Ill , p. 99 ; my translation). In deal ing with the 
radical nature of Manet's painting , Thore invokes the 
figure of the mag ician , who like a remarkable artist can 
manipulate his technique to produce startling effects. 
Through his own creative analogy, Thore manages to 
traverse his critical field with a rational dodge-that is, 
he makes a move that appeals to our reasonable 
expectations. Attributing "magic" to Manet, Thore 
seems to explain unconventional effects in a con-
ventional manner; and he reinforces his reasoned 
argument by comparing Manet to two earlier masters, 
equally innovative perhaps, but of a past age, and 
hence assimilated within the critical canon . 
I do not wish to deny that criticism may (or even 
must) have an artistic component, nor that it may lead 
to further creative discovery - caricature itself is a 
revealing art. The critic cannot, however, allow his art 
to dominate his rational science, for he would himself 
then los~ the distinction between creativity and origi-
nality, producing his own original art rather than a 
clearly defined criticism . Unabashedly artistic criticism 
mig.ht itself appear fraudulent; it would not test its object 
agamst any rigid standard. To the extent that criticism 
serves to maintain or reinforce desirable standards it 
must hold a rational line against the release of dis- ' 
ruptive forces . It must question innovation , rather than 
merely accept or extend it, to maintain authority and 
guard against the fraudulent. If, to return to our first 
example, the truth of Einstein 's E=mc2 is not imme-
diately apparent, Einstein 's critic must demand a 
rational explanation . 
Miscreation 
We know, however, that radical creation lies beyond 
identification by typing , comparison , or simple deduc-
tion from the given ; it should be as free of its origins as 
E = mc2 seemed free of its scientific context before it 
was creatively discovered .13 A creation , in other words, 
demonstrates originality when its specific origins 
cannot be found , when it seems to have no sources of 
its own , but becomes the source for other, lesser 
creations. Although E=mc2 may be deducible from 
preexisti ng mathematical laws, it did not seem pre-
dicted by them ; it appeared the product of an individual 
intuition , not a mechanical mathemical operation avail-
able to any investigator. Its generation , appearing as 
spontaneous to the popular mind , presented a powerful 
challenge to belief. 
The critical interpreter is a believer, and one who 
wishes to bring the deviant creation back within his 
system of belief. If the creation presents difficulties, he 
will not hesitate to see it as miscreation , ridiculing it in 
the process. In fact, the most radical creations most 
readily become miscreations when re-formed by their 
critics . The critic must distort creation , making it mis-
creation , re-forming and rehabilitating it, as if to expose 
the miscreance, or at least prevent more damage from 
being done to society, that is, the society of both artist 
and critic. As a re-former, the critic may save the 
miscreant artist from his own acts of creation and seek 
to confine the deviant truth within accepted bounds. 
Thus, critics often suggest, in advance, the path an 
artist's creative activity should take. 
A creance is a line used to hold a hawk in training at 
bay or in check ; it is a line defining belief and limiting 
behavior. Miscreance or misbelief introduces wildness 
into a society. When the critic cannot find rational 
explanation , when he cannot assimilate creation , he 
can either yield his critical stance, accepting , at face 
value, the new truth of creation , or he can seek to 
expose the act of miscreance. The committed critic 's 
aggressively skeptical attitude toward creation reveals 
not irreverence, but belief, a healthy attitude toward the 
reality of his (our) own world . He would prefer not to 
; allow the release of untrustworthy hawks and must 
1 choose to caricature, to exhibit any original creation 
; as miscreation .14 
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Part VI 
Have I gone too far in making critics and creative artists 
(and creative scientists) adversaries? Can there be no 
critical cooperation , perhaps a completion of the work 
of art by means of a body of critical commentary? The 
creation or work of art considered as an external 
object seems capable of bearing endless (but not any) 
interpretation ; it is an undeniable fact in the world , a 
truth to be perceived . But the association of creativity 
with originality leads to questions of artistic genesis 
rather than of final artistic form. Where does the work 
come from? How does it develop? When the meaning 
or truth of creation is verified not in objectively defined 
(yet not necessarily permanent) properties of the work , 
but demonstrated rather in its genesis, the problematic 
nature of the critique of creation emerges. Often we 
speak of creation intensified by the term "radical " to 
designate its genetic originality- radical creation has 
no simpler antecedent form ; it is a root from which 
other forms grow. Its own parentage and kinship rela-
tions are not known with certainty; it may thus evade our 
categories and comparisons. 
Our two caricaturists have demonstrated indirectly 
that radical , "original" human creation can be the 
product neither of simple reason nor of mere chance. 
Like Collingwood, they do not wish to confine genuine 
creativity to questions of craft, nor do they wish to 
eliminate the sense of a directing human will . Harris 
and Cham both chose to reduce creation to the 
comical by making the creative act appear outside 
human control , with the success or failure of the 
creation only ironically related to the conditions of its 
generation . They might both have succeeded equally 
well , however, had they chosen to expose some truly 
rational procedure to account for the productions of 
Einstein and Manet. This, too, would serve to discredit 
any claim to radical creativity. In this alternative situ-
ation , Harris and Cham would not as readily appear 
as caricaturists, but rather as hard-headed detectives 
uncovering acts of fraud or charlatanism . They would 
show that the cr.eations under investigation were some-
thing less than we (or their creators) might presume. 
The creation would appear as if prefigured in its assumed 
preconditions. In this viewing , any obscurity in its 
apparent generative procedure could be attributed to 
either one of two failings-to an inelegant presentation , 
that is, an act of technical ineptitide, or to an intentional 
deception , some pretense of sincerity. The latter failure , 
one of character rather than of skill , would amount 
to a conscious act of making the easy look difficult, so 
that originality might seem to arise from some radical 
technical discontinuity. I will come to argue that the 
art historian (as opposed to the art critic) character-
istically demands, and finds, a rationally structured 
context, however well hidden, out of which the creation 
under investigation may logically arise. But first we 
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must consider the critic 's evaluative task of distinguish-
ing what is technically easy, or only deceptively difficult, 
from what is genu inely difficu lt or "original. " 
Albert Aurier, the early champion of Van Gogh 's 
artistic original ity and sincerity, admitted that this 
evaluative project cou ld not be completed by applying 
any objective critical standards (1893: 260). The critic 
who encounters Manet, Van Gogh, or any other creator 
whose techniq ue seems deviant, lacks the means to 
judge whether the departure from convention (or from 
evidently rational proced ure) is an indication of a mere 
avoidance of difficulty or a consequence of its necessary 
acceptance. For, if tech nical deviation were associated 
unquestioningly with rad ical creativity, then fraud 
might become rampant; any "artist" might readily 
master the technique of originality by exhibiting a 
faulty craft wh ich the critic would take to be a sign of 
creative authority, genuine creative deviance. The 
miscreation would seem the most genuine creation. 
In approaching this unsatisfactory solution , we seem 
to have slipped into speaking of creation as located in a 
fixed created thing , an end product of craft, subject to 
(or resisting) analysis . But we had already suggested 
that the genuineness of "orig inal" creation would be best 
determined by an investigation of the act itself, not its 
resu lting object. Harris and Cham seem to have specu-
lated as to what acts or situations could have generated 
E=mc2 and the Incident in the Bull Ring ; their interest 
lay in the creative process. The related desire to make 
the most empirically founded judgments of creative acts 
has led others to photograph Picasso and Matisse 
working out successive stages of their paintings and to 
record before the camera a performance of Jackson 
Pollock, pouring one of his "drip" paintings upon a 
sheet of glass seen from below. Nevertheless, firm 
evidence of any principle linking specific technical 
patterns to authentic creativity has remained elusive. 
The committed skepticism of Harris and Cham seems 
justified. 
Charles Baudelaire, who spoke in defense of Manet's 
creative powers, sought to solve the problem of the 
critic by allowing him neither the easy shortcuts of 
complete acceptance or complete rejection of creation , 
nor the diversion of his own self-indulgent creative 
activity. There remained a firm distinction between 
critical and artistic conduct for Baudelaire, and (as a 
critic) he maintained his distance from works of art. 
Yet he recognized a dual nature in artistic creation 
itself. Of Delacroix he wrote: 
It is clear that, in his eyes, imagination was the most 
precious gift, the most important faculty, but that this faculty 
remained powerless and sterile if it did not have at its 
command a swift technical skill (une habilite rapid e), 
capable of following the great despotic faculty in its 
impatient flights of fancy. There was certainly no need for 
him to stoke up the fires of his imagination , constantly at 
white heat; but he always found the day too short for 
the study of the techn ical means of expression (les 
moyens d 'expression) . [1972 :363] 
Baudelaire never regarded the study of technical 
means and conventional devices as unworthy of the 
attention of the artistic imagination , the source of 
creation. If something new was to come into our world , 
it could do so only with the active cooperation of an 
artistic medium or language subject to reasoned 
analysis. According to Baudelaire's standard , the 
works of Einstein and Manet, if technically malformed 
as Harris and Cham depicted them , would indeed be 
suspect. For Baudelaire , "a great painter [or any 
creator] is of necessity a good painter [i .e., techn ically 
skilled ], because a universal imagination comprises 
the understanding of all technical means and the 
desire to acquire them " (1972 :306) . The artist must be 
master of both his immediate passions and his mediat-
ing science or technique.15 
Baudelaire as critic sought a means of preserving 
the sense of mastery in the work of art. His was at 
times a passive criticism , yet a productive one. As 
critic , Baudelaire often seemed himself to assume the 
"animal-like stare" of curiosity, wonder, absorption , 
and even ecstasy that he associated with the childlike 
element in the modern artist (1972:398). And 
Baudelaire willingly gave up the critic 's greatest 
defense against disruption- not his reason, for he 
kept that, but his belief. Baudelaire associated belief 
and principle with systems, schools, and academies. 
The Universal Exhibition of 1855 , which included 
products of many foreign cultures , seemed to provide 
him with a field of experience that no system of belief 
could encompass; his world was at once radically 
expanded and multiplied . He recognized the opportunity 
for his own education and growth before an abundance 
of products of the imagination serving to call his 
attention to the power of any single such product. In 
the foreign , the incompatible, he discovered a vital 
beauty: "Anything that is not slightly misshapen has an 
air of insensibility ... irregularity is the characteristic of 
beauty ... lebeau est toujours bizarre " (197 5:161-162 ; 
1962 :215) . In associating the beautiful with the bizarre, 
even the "ugly," Baudelaire realized , in effect, the identity 
of creation and miscreation and the need to suppress 
his own belief, his own prejudgment. He wrote in the 
theoretical preface to his review of the Universal 
Exhibition : 
Miscreation 
Like all my friends I have tried more than once to lock 
myself inside a system , so as to be able to pontificate as 
I liked . But a system is a kind of damnation that condemns 
us to perpetual backsliding ; we are always having to invent 
another, and this form of fatigue is a cruel punishment. .. 
And every time, soma spontaneous unexpected product 
of universal vitality would come and give the lie to my 
puerile and old-fashioned wisdom ... Under the threat of 
being constantly humiliated by another conversion , I took 
a big decision ... I became content to feel ; I came back and 
bought sanctuary in impeccable naivete. I humbly beg 
pardon of academics of every kind ... at least I can now 
declare, in so far as a man can answer for his virtues, that 
my mind now enjoys a more abundant impartiality. 
[1972 :117-118] 
Without abandoning his powers of reason (he has 
much lucid commentary to apply to lngres and 
Delacroix) , Baudelaire allows himself to deviate in his 
belief, to submit himself to the products of artistic 
miscreance. This is to say that Baudelaire comes to 
hold a different kind of belief, perhaps a misbelief, one 
more compatible with the full concept of creation , 
whether linked to originality or not. He comes to 
believe in or value change and growth in the individual . 
He expects to benefit from a changing rather than a 
stable world, and he locates the source of creative 
change in human imagination . Still , his concern is for 
the growth of the world of his society as well as of the 
individual ; and such social or collaborative change is 
best conceived as continuous rather than radically 
disjunctive. In the absence of any ultimate all-powerful 
artistic experience that would obviate the function of 
rational critical discourse and lead to silence, Baudelaire 
depends upon the reasoned mediation of artistic tech-
nique and critical language to establish a community 
of shared creative experience. When he speaks, for 
example, of the painter's use of color, he refers both 
to clear rational principles- "the bigger the picture, the 
broader must be the touches of color" -and to artistic 
achievement founded upon such principles, yet extend-
ing beyond his own reason 's firm grasp-the co!orist's 
"most delicate operations are the result of a sent1ment 
which long practice has brought to a degree of 
sureness that defeats description ." At the point of such 
technical facility, imagination is liberated . The creative 
process develops through a rational application of 
· technique to a point where it may seem to tr~nscend . 
· that background- this is artistic mastery. Art1st1c med1a 
; are "no more than the most humble handmaids of a 
unique and superior faculty. If a very neat execution is 
1 necessary, that is so that the language of dreams may 
I be very clearly translated " (1972:304-305) . 
Believing in both reason and the dream, but not in 
fixed beliefs, and identifying artistic creation with 
apparent deviance, Baudelaire could , as an individual 
case demanded , defend an artist he admired by 
demonstrating either his capacity for rational science 
or for imaginative art. He could seek to negate the 
effects of caricature by claiming that his artist was 
indeed rational-or indeed imaginative. In the case of 
Manet he found it necessary to do both . 
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Baudelaire defended the very creation we have seen 
Cham ridicule , the Incident in the Bull Ring. This paint-
ing , aside from being attacked for exhibiting a mis-
application of technique, came to be seen as revealing 
a lack of originality. This amounted to a most serious 
charge against the artist, since genuine artistic imagina-
tion , in Baudelaire's own words, "creates a new world " 
(1972 :299). If Manet's art could be shown to reveal 
nothing original , to reduce to a pastiche of "sources"-
familiar images and stylistic devices merely recom-
bined so that the new work amounted to no more than 
the sum of its well-known parts-then Manet would 
appear a fraudulent artist, misrepresenting old forms 
as a new creation . Cham 's caricature of Manet was 
reinforced by some remarks made by Theophile Thore, 
to which we have already referred . Unlike Cham , 
Thore found something favorable to say of Manet, 
noting that, although his style was unconventional , and 
perhaps extremely so, it was forceful . Thore neverthe-
less raised the problem of artistic originality by speak1ng 
of "sources," asserting that the dead toreador in the 
Incident of the Bull Ring had been copied after a figure 
by Velasquez and that the general style of the painting 
was dependent upon both Velasquez and Goya 
(1893:Vol . Ill , pp. 98-1 00). 16 (The "source" of the 
figure of the dead toreador given by Thore, a painting 
at that time in the Pourtales Collection , is no longer 
attributed to Velasquez.) Although Thore might expect 
to find a complex of resemblances, even in works of 
the most original artists, Baudelaire took the challenge 
of his remarks very seriously.17 
Having previously made Thore's acquaintance, 
Baudelaire sent a friendly reply to his critique of Manet. 
He insisted that Manet was both rational and creatively 
original. With respect to the first point, Baudelaire 
wrote: "M. Manet, who is regarded wild and insane, is 
simply an ordinary straightforward man , doing every-
thing he can to be reasonable (raisonnable) , but 
unfortunately touched with romanticism since birth. " 
For Baudelaire " romanticism" was associated with 
individuality and passionate feeling ; yet Manet, like 
Delacroix, exhibited as much reason and science as 
could be applied to this imaginative force. Baudelaire 
thus implied that Manet's technique was appropriate to 
his artistic enterprise. Moreover, Manet was an original , 
for whose work the term "pastiche" could not be 
employed - Baudelaire stated flatly that Manet had not 
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been influenced by the Span ish masters; there were 
no "sources" for his creation; any resemblance was a 
"mysterious coincidence" (1948 : Vol. IV, pp. 275-277). 18 
Arguing in this man ner, Baudelaire sought to restore 
to Manet's painting the two qualities which caricaturists 
would have removed: a sense of the rational, meaning-
fu l application of tech nique and a sense of originality, 
the creation of someth ing genuinely new. Art historians, 
as opposed to critics, tend to concentrate on the 
second factor, originality. Thore himself was a pioneer 
of art history, adept at relating works of art to historical 
contexts, both social environments and pictorial tradi-
tions. In speaking of Manet, he was facing the task of 
evaluating a contemporary, not an established historical 
figure . Baudelaire thanked Thore for rendering Manet 
at least some justice in regard ing his work as a serious 
contribution. Baudelaire knew well that the denial of 
originality was a more advanced stage in the process 
of critical acceptance than either a lack of critical 
commentary or critical ridicule . 
Historians especially are likely to be silent before 
radical creation. This is silence as Collingwood might 
interpret it, the silence of incomprehension . Faced 
with the task of "explaining " or providing a historical 
context for a work that resembles little of the familiar, 
they may act as if the work did not exist; resisting inter-
pretation , the work seems unworthy of any interpreta-
tion at all and remains unassimilated. To point out its 
flaws, to describe it as fraudulent creation , is to accept 
its presence, however grudgingly. At this stage carica-
ture is most apparent and the work may be compared 
unfavorably with accepted members of the tradition ; 
clearly it is miscreation . Usually, however, art historians 
begin to discover sources for the work , a context 
eventually so well defined that the character of the new 
work seems inevitably determined . Assuming Manet's 
experience of Goya and Velasquez, for example, one 
argues that he is led to produce the Incident in the Bull 
Ring by way of a reasoned use of an imitative technique. 
Simply conceived , such completion or perfection of 
explication seems the ideal of art history, especially of 
an art history regarded as a rational "science. " Unfor-
tunately, once the art historian 's work is completed , 
the artistic creation seems - perhaps not miscreation -
but rather no "original " creation at all ; it is merely the 
sum of its parts, lacking any mystery, devoid of any 
personalized element that can resist public under-
standing. Now a dead issue for the critic , it becomes 
dead art. An insistence upon originality may lead to a 
standard that cannot be met; the able historian will 
eventually construct an amalgam of antecedents to 
substitute for any work he considers worthy of his study. 
My position on the historian 's role risks oversimplifi-
cation , yet I think this view fundamentally accurate in 
its focus. The historian , like the critic , can perform his 
task too well , can believe too strongly in the rational 
order of things; he can overdetermine the creative 
work so that it appears a product solely of reason and 
familiar technique rather than of a higher Baudelairean 
imagination . Nevertheless, as Baudelaire knew, in the 
face of creation one still does not abandon reason . Art 
history can become caricature when it retains too 
much of the mystery of creation just as when it seeks 
to eliminate all such mystery. The art historian 's appeal 
to the unarticulated evidence of the visual can produce 
an explication, couched in rational language, having 
no firm foundation in reason. In the alternative to the 
search for clearly identified sources and other elements 
of a structured historical context, the art historian can 
appeal too strongly to a non rational sense of individual 
artistic identity and the " look" of the objective evidence 
he presents. 
My choice of illustration for th is point- Herbert 
Cook's brief and generally forgotten "Note on Spanzotti , 
the Master of Sodoma" (1918 :208) - will seem so 
extreme that it might be considered a caricature of art 
history itself, an example of miscreated criticism. The 
resemblance to other more successful art historical 
presentations should , however, be evident, as well as 
should the unsatisfactorily indeterminate nature of any 
appeal by a critic-historian to his reader's own critical 
vision . Spanzotti , an Italian Renaissance painter, was, 
as Cook admits, "hardly of the first , or even second , 
rank as an artist. " Cook's purpose is to attribute to the 
oeuvre of Spanzotti , reconstituted only in the publ ica-
tion on this artist by Conte Alessandro Baudi di Vesme, 
one more painting , a Madonna and Child Enthroned, 
previously attributed to the school of Foppa. Cook 
notes that the Madonna bears a monogram found also 
on a painting given by Conte di Vesme to Spanzotti 's 
hand. To this circumstantial evidence, Cook adds what 
he takes to be more conclusive: 
The general style of the Madonna tallies with other works 
of the kind [attributed to Spanzotti] (all published in [Conte 
di Vesme's] book) , to which the reader must be referred . 
Suffice it to say that Conte di Vesme concurs in the addi-
tion of this picture to the list of Spanzotti 's works, although 
he only knows of it from a photograph . 
Cook has given his argument a form that allows him 
to evade any rational analysis of the work itself; he 
meets creation with his own creative insight and he 
reaches a decision without establishing any clear 
grounds for doing so. The reader is referred to photo-
graphs of Spanzotti 's works (and secondarily to Conte 
di Vesme's authority) , but never to analytical descrip-
tions of the photog raphs; and he must thus reach his 
own creative intuition regarding the question of attri-
Miscreation 
bution - he will either "see" to agreeing with Cook or 
he will not. Ironically, Cook's "Note on Spanzotti" was 
followed by this bracketed comment from his editor: 
Owing to the difficulty of procuring photographs, we are 
precluded from the possibility of supplying illustrations of 
the pictures which , as Mr. Cook points out, strengthen an 
attribution which prima facie seems not ful ly convincing . 
The ed ito r here refers to those illustrations which 
would , according to Cook, establish " links" between 
the admitted "extremes of style" exhibited by his two 
primary objects of study, the two paintings bearing the 
same monogram , but presumably differing in date of 
execution . In sum , Cook's "argument" depended upon 
the simple presentation of a certain number of 
Spanzotti 's works (as photographs), but the works 
could not be present - consequently Cook was left 
with no argument and his reader, or viewer, could 
experience no conviction . Had Cook's editor attained 
only slightly more ironic distance from his own journal , 
he might have asked whether the mere presence of 
photographs could ever have settled a question 
formulated around concepts of historical context and 
stylistic attribution. If the works reveal "extremes of 
style ," what concept of style is sufficient to bridge the 
logical gap between them? How many mediating 
images must exist to give us a sense of orderly tech-
nical evolution? 
Cook's mode of art history and criticism might be 
very creative in its association of images linked by 
stylistic qualities that remain ineffable. If, however, art 
history is to be considered not a "creative" art, but an 
academic study, rational like a "science," Cook, as 
scientist, would seem to open himself to the same 
caricaturing criticism that Einstein suffered . If indeed no 
stylistic link among Spanzotti 's works can be articulated , 
then perhaps Cook has operated under no meaningful 
principle and has discovered the contents of his artist's 
oeuvre merely by chance, as Einstein , according to 
Harris's humorous account, may have fallen into dis-
covering E=mc2 . We have seen t~at , on the one hand , 
the art historical study of sources may attenuate or even 
defeat the power of creation by moving toward a final 
denial of originality. But, on the other hand , the appeal 
to a sympathetic critical "vision " may render creation 
meaningless, subject to the endless vagaries of indi-
vidual sensibility. The refusal to use any clearly articu-
lated standard of appraisal serves the ends of criticism 
no more than does the reduction of a work to a con-
ventional pattern. 
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Now if indeed we were all to be equally convinced of 
some truth by the mere presentation of a visual image 
for our inspection , without our being able to speak 
rationally of the cause of our agreement, might we not 
feel that our critical enterprise of interpretation had 
succeeded? Would this be a silence of complete under-
standing? I must argue that such a result is not one of 
an ideal criticism , but of some ideal art. The critic must 
assume that such universal agreement will not be 
reached ; there must always be further investigation and 
debate with regard to the work of art. The critic must 
not remain passive indefinitely before the work ; he must 
retain his will , a kind of belief. He expresses his will , 
his resistance , even his stubborn misunderstanding , by 
means of his reason. He assumes, as Baudelaire did , 
that both the artist's return to the creative , imaginative 
vision of childhood and the critic's own assumption of 
a childlike na·(vete are to some extent voluntary He 
assumes that although art strives for perfection , this 
state is never attained ; beauty must be transient. If the 
unexpected act of fully "original " creation should occur, 
the critic would seem to face a divine rather than human 
creator, one not to be questioned. In this case, any 
critical commentary would surely be an act of irreverent 
miscreance. In order to be both critic and believer, the 
critic must assume that artists only pretend to divinity; 
their miscreations must be unmasked. In this manner, 
the ideal of individual and social growth can be main-
tained amidst the continuing encounter with creations, 
none of which will effect complete or final change; each 
will be seen as flawed or misformed to an extent suf-
ficient to call forth further creation. Creation becomes 
possible only in a world of miscreation , a world not 
completely formed. 
Part VII 
In my own play upon words, as I linked miscreation to 
the miscreant, there was perhaps an element of carica-
ture involved ; for the " reason " in my argument might 
have seemed to derive from the chance alphabetical 
placement of "miscreation " following upon "miscreant." 
Perhaps it appeared that I had no more reason to associ-
ate the concepts of misbelief and misgrowth (or mis-
shaping) than did Harris 's Einstein to move from 
E=ma2 to E=mb2 to a final miscreated solution . I 
played briefly with etymology, too , speculating upon the 
possibility of a core of meaning subsuming both belief 
or principle and creation or growth , a concept such 
as education or development. If at the end of all this 
speculation any belief can be reached , it must be in the 
relevance of the notion of education or human growth 
to both artistic and critical enterprises. 
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Creation is a change from which we learn. In its most 
radical form it would force an entirely new system of 
belief, a new set of principles, upon us; growth would 
follow from a new root. It seems, however, that the 
"radical" creation we normally encounter is only of a 
relatively radical nature - the creations, for example, of 
Manet and Einstein, allowing room for doubt, remain 
subject to caricaturing criticism . We learn from such 
criticism so long as it does not continue to demand 
insistently what creation cannot provide, a final rational 
explanation for its own presence. "In the realm of poetry 
and art," Baudelaire wrote, "the great discoverers rarely 
have precursors. Every flowering is spontaneous, indi-
vidual." And , just as the artist must to some extent be 
cut off from models or sources, so the scholar or critic 
must embody the creative imagination in his work: 
"What does opinion say of a scholar without imagina-
tion? That he has learned all that can be learned, because 
it has been taught, but he will never discover laws as 
yet unsuspected of existing " (1972:122, 300). The 
critic must be receptive to a new truth. 
Yet not passively receptive. Whoever performs the 
critical act must assume that the truth of a work of art 
is not self-evident; the artist may have intended to falsify 
or he may simply have been deluded. The problematic 
area to be investigated is not originality, but creativity 
in the narrower sense. One must consider the artist's 
means of expression, for technique conveys the artistic 
communication that we must presume to have failed; it 
fails to attain immediate universality, to convince, or to 
silence. As he remains unconvinced , the critic is free to 
disassociate creativity from originality, to expose any 
pretense to full artistic originality. As he applies reason 
to resistant creation, the critic seeks neither the identifi-
cation of a complete set of "sources" nor the reception 
of a final message. Instead he concentrates on the 
language of creation, the structured source of com-
munication and community. He remains silent on proper 
usage and points of agreement, but must speak out on 
seeing any irregularity or discontinuity. To take such an 
evaluative stance, to become active in response to the 
work and to defend oneself against it, is already to have 
considered the communication flawed and to have 
posited a greater art to come. The present creation 
begins to appear subject to caricature and we, in turn, 
seem able to transcend that which seemed itself to 
escape the world of our own past. With some irony, the 
critic must see all who claim the special status of artist 
as miscreants and all their creation as miscreation; 
but such vision makes continuing education and 
growth- indeed life itself - possible. 
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Notes 
When Collingwood speaks of deliberate and responsible making that 
is yet not predetermined (1938:236-238), he has in mind a 
distinction between automatism and self-consciousness in the use 
of an expressive medium. 
2 See also Collingwood (1938:43) where the author distinguishes, 
as a falsification of artistic originality, any uniqueness or novelty planned 
and achieved for its own sake. 
3 Cf. Polanyi and Prosch (1978:98): "the meaning of a poem comes 
into existence only with its words. " (Original emphasis.) 
4 Cf. Collingwood (1938:273): "The activity which generates an arti£tic 
experience is the activity of consciousness ... [art's] origin lies .. . in 
[man 's] nature as a thinking being ." 
5 I have explored the relationship of art to life in an essay entitled 
"Art and Life: A Metaphorical Relationship" (1978a). 
6 But it need not involve extreme individuality; original artistic expres-
sion may be, indeed normally is, collaborative. See Collingwood 
(1938:315-324). 
7 Cf. Collingwood (1938 : 130, 291). In postmedieval Christian theology, 
divine creation is usually conceived as ex nihilo (as it is in 
Collingwood 's theory of art). Nevertheless, the Biblical account of 
creation need not be regarded primarily as an account of origins 
but rather as a statement of the relation of man to God (man 's 
creator); and the notion of a "continuing " or immanent creation also 
competes with that of creation as a first cause or historical origin. 
To speak of an original act of divine creation in terms of a working 
of preexisting matter (as in pagan myth) seems a metaphorical 
inversion - that is, the act of God is, to some extent, de mystified 
or dedifferentiated by being described in terms of a familiar human 
procedure. (On this point, cf. Frye [1980:4]: for some the "notion 
of a creating God is a projection from the fact that man makes things, 
and for them a divine creator has only the reality of a shadow thrown 
by ourselves.") If creation , as a kind of crafting or fabricating, is to 
be distinguished in its mundane and divine modes, divine creation is, 
indeed , best associated with the notion of creation ex nihilo. 
8 Original emphasis. The translator renders Barthes' "Einstein dessine" 
· as "cartoons of Einstein ." Barthes is contrasting the photograph 
to what he regards as a more interpretive and distorted class of 
images, all artistic drawings or renderings , whether self-consciously 
caricatural or not. 
Miscreation 
9 Cham was the pseudonym of Amedee de Noe (1819 - 1879). The 
translation of the caption to his caricature (following in the text) is my 
own. The Incident in the Bull Ring, that Cham represents schema-
tically, no longer exists in its entirety. Manet, himself, dismembered 
it, and two fragments are known today: the Dead Toreador in the 
National Gallery, Washington (Figure 3) , and the Bullfight in the Frick 
Collection , New York (illustrated as Plate 8a in Hamilton 1954 ). For 
general discussions of the critical response to the painting and its 
history, see Hamilton (1954 :51-64) and Hanson ( 1977:82-85) On 
the problem of Manet's cut canvases, see Hanson (1970: 158-166). 
10 In 1867 Zola remarked (1970: 1 08) that the fragment of the Incident in 
the Bull Ring, the Dead Toreador, was nevertheless relatively "detailed " 
and "tightly" modeled ; the public would prefer it to some of Manet's 
other works. Apparently, however, the public (Cham) had previously 
found Manet's entire painting incoherent. The perspective was 
considered faulty, as well as the modeling , and Cham 's drawing 
seems to ridicule both these technical features - but his caption calls 
our attention to the modeling especially. 
11 Erwin Panofsky argues (1962 : 121 -182, esp. 172-173) that the 
modern association of either artistic or scientific genius with inspira-
tion , "divine madness," and related notions originates in the 
Renaissance. 
12 There may, indeed , be situations in which negation becomes more 
threatening than deviance, but creative activity (as here conceived) 
is not among them. The problematic nature of the individual who 
lacks belief, will , patterns of behavior, or "preference" is presented by 
Herman Melville in his "Bartleby the Scrivener." In this short story, 
the characters Turkey and Nippers may be described as deviant, 
and therefore troublesome, but finally assimilated comfortably within 
their society Bartleby, on the other hand , seems the negation of all 
that society serves to establish - he does not express improper 
desires, but no desires at all - and it is Bartleby, not Turkey or Nippers, 
who must be institutionalized in the end. Franz Kafka, too, raises 
the problem of negation in , to choose one example, his parable 
"An Old Manuscript. " In this brief tale, Kafka describes villagers who 
mistake as deviance, or the desire for the unacceptable, the nega-
tiveness of their nomadic intruders-the nomads' inexpressiveness, 
the absolute unpredictability of their behavior. See Shiff (1978b) 
tor a discussion of the Kafka parable. 
13 On this issue, ct. Polanyi (1958: 117-131) 
14 1 have argued (1978b) that the critic (or audience) must impose 
rational standards upon art even while he maintains that true art must 
always evade such judgments. . . . . . 
15 Similarly, Collingwood locates art man 1magmat1on conce1ved as 
mediating between unarticulated desires and rational intellectual 
constructs (1938 :195 , 213 , 221-224 , 281-282). 
116 Michael Fried , who argues from within a more specific historical 
context than that of the present essay (1969 :28-82 , esp. 67 -68) , 
provides the deepest understanding of the comments that Thore 
brought to bear upon Manet's art, ~elating them to not1ons of nat1on~l 
character and realism which.Thore had previously developed . Fned s 
essay is an unusually rich account of the significance of an artist's . 
use of specific sources and transcends many art h1stoncal d1ff1cult1es 
to which 1 wish to call attention in my account of the exchange 
between Thore and Baudelaire. Ct. Fried 's distinction between "sanc-
tion" and "influence" (1969:fn. 47, p. 70) 
,17 On Thore's habit of noting resemblances , see, for example , the 
passage on Diaz's originality, written in 1846 (1893:Vol. I, pp. 290-291) 
18 Letter to Theophile Thore, c. 20 June 1864, repnnted 1n Baudelaire 
(1948:Vol. IV, pp. 275-277 ; my translation) . Baudelaire, in 1846, had 
defe~ded Delacroix in very similar fashion , argu1ng that th1s pa1nter 
was a master of rational technique, in whose works chance played 
no part whatsoever, and that he was one of those "who retam the1r , 
originality even after having borrowed from all the genu1ne sources 
(1972:65). Thore replied to Baudelaire 's objections 1n what has , 
become a familiar art historical manner: conced1ng to Baudela~re s 
claim that Manet had not seen the Velasquez in quest1on , Thore 
simply argued that the artist must have encountered some 1nter- . 
mediary image, perhaps a photograph of the work or some graphic 
study or reproduction (1893: Vol. Ill , pp. 137-138). 
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